Many cognitive experiments that measure performance across multiple trials use a trial sequence that is unsystematic or random. Performance in these experiments is known to fluctuate according to the sequence of events leading up to any given trial. The current experiments examined how these changes relate to a) explicit anticipation of the events on the next trial, and b) automatic facilitation based on recent event history. A dissociation was consistently found between trends in expectancy and trends in performance. This effect manifests in response biases in choice reaction time tasks, and spatial biases in attention under dual-stream rapid serial visual presentation. The results indicate automatic facilitation of controlled cognitive processes which is clearly dissociable from conscious anticipation.
Do multiple processes mediate learned responses?
Performance on any cognitive task (and the execution of almost every observable response) changes with experience. These learned changes in performance are observable over various timescales, from lifespan development down to variations from one trial to the next in a single experimental session.
For as long as learning has been studied, a question has persisted about the relationship between learned changes in performance and conscious thought processes; is it possible for learned changes in performance to occur automatically, with little control or volition, or are these changes necessarily based on the conscious beliefs, intentions, and efforts of the individual?
The cognitive models implicit in this question can be summarized as in Figure 1 . In the context of human associative learning, a clear example of this debate has received considerable attention in recent years. For instance, Mitchell, De Houwer and Lovibond (2009) have argued that "conditioned" responding in anticipation of an event only occurs when accompanied by an explicit and conscious expectation that the event is imminent. They argue that there is virtually no compelling evidence that associative learning affects responding automatically, independent of conscious expectation. Top: learning the contingency between two events (E1 & E2) via a propositional process leads to a conscious expectation of E2 which directly affects behaviour on other performance measures. Bottom: learning by one or several processes leads to conscious expectancy of E2 and influences task performance in a dissociable fashion.
Dissociation between responding and expectancy
Perhaps the clearest empirical refutation of this claim is a dissociation first reported by Perruchet (1985) using eyelidconditioning and since replicated by Perruchet, Cleeremans and Destrebecqz (2006) using a simple reaction time task (for the sake of brevity, we will focus on the latter). Perruchet et al. (2006) used a simple computer-based reaction time task in which participants were required to press a key as quickly as possible when a response cue (a white square) appeared on the computer screen. The experiment consisted of many trials, each of which began with a short 500Hz tone. On half the trials the tone was immediately followed by the response cue and on the other half no cue was presented. Knowledge that the tone signals the occurrence of the response cue is assumed to improve preparation for (and increase the speed of) responding. During the inter-trial interval of a separate section of trials, Perruchet et al. (2006) also asked participants to explicitly rate the degree to which they expected the response cue to appear on the next trial.
This procedure involves randomization of trial order, in which runs of consecutive tone-cue trials and runs of consecutive tone-alone trials arise naturally throughout the procedure. Ideally, the frequency of occurrence of these runs follows a binomial distribution, such that long runs of tone-cue trials and long runs of tone-alone trials both occur relatively infrequently, while shorter runs are more common. Each trial in an experiment can be classified according to the length of the immediately preceding run of identical trials, as shown in Figure 2 . Perruchet et al. (2006) predicted that the length of the preceding run would affect performance on the current trial.
By analyzing performance on trials classified in this fashion, Perruchet et al. (2006) demonstrated a striking dissociation between the speed of responding and explicit expectancy of the response cue. They found that runs of tone-cue trials produce faster responding, and runs of tonealone produce slower responding. But when asked to explicitly rate their expectancy of the cue on the next trial, runs of tone-cue produced weaker expectancy, and runs of tone-alone produced stronger expectancy that the cue would appear, in line with a strong gambler's fallacy effect (Ayton & Fischer, 2004) . This dissociation has since been referred to as the Perruchet effect (Weidemann, Tangen, Lovibond, & Mitchell, 2009 ). was sometimes followed by a response cue (+) and sometimes by no cue (-), and (b) a task where trials end with a left (L) or right (R) response cue or contain a stimulus appearing on the left or right.
Controlled and automatic influences of contingency learning on performance
The Perruchet effect has been taken by some as evidence that human associative learning is mediated by separable and independent learning systems. For instance Clark, Manns and Squire (2001) argue that the effect supports a distinction between an explicit declarative memory system on which reasoning and conscious thought processes operate, and an implicit, procedural, and largely motoric non-declarative system which produces conditioning via the strengthening and weakening of simple links. This view has been expressed in several forms by other authors (e.g. Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009; Weidemann et al., 2009 ) but always with the underlying assumption that if the Perruchet effect constitutes a valid dissociation of two trends in learned behaviour then each trend must be supported by an independent learning system. At the same time, some evidence suggests that the Perruchet effect could be sensitive to the timing between the contingent events (Clark et al. 2001) and is not observed in tasks that involve a greater degree of cognitive control (Destrebecqz et al., in press ). The view is consequently emerging that very simple reflexive tasks produce conditioning-like performance and yield the Perruchet effect whereas tasks that have a reliance on working memory, such as trace conditioning, or cognitive control, such as choice reaction time, do not show these distinctions (Clark et al., 2001, Destrebecqz et al., in press) . It is debatable whether the available empirical evidence strongly supports this view as other aspects of the methodology employed in these studies may explain the absence of a Perruchet effect. In any case, conflicting results, including those presented here, cast some doubt on this distinction between simple conditioning procedures and other cognitive tasks.
An alternative way of explaining the Perruchet effect, and one which has received relatively little attention, is to assume that multiple processes influence the performance of a task as a consequence of contingency learning, irrespective of the manner in which the associations between the relevant events have been learned. By this account, performance on a task is influenced in various ways by the information acquired by the individual, some of which are automatic and some of which are under the conscious control. No task is affected by learning in a purely automatic or purely controlled way; the balance between the two could depend on factors at the time of learning, such as attention to the contingencies between events, and factors at the time of responding such as the particular response requirements. This could be viewed as being comparable in some respects to Jacoby's (1991) distinction between automatic and intentional retrieval processes in memory.
Accordingly, all cognitive tasks are influenced by automatic facilitation and by the conscious expectancy of events. Nevertheless, dissociating the influence of the two factors requires not only a paradigm in which the two work against each other (such as the Perruchet effect) but also an appropriate choice of response measures that are differentially sensitive to automatic and controlled influences.
With this framework in mind, we have recently examined whether similar dissociations are evident in tasks that require a greater degree of cognitive control. Perruchet et al. (2006) speculate about whether their dissociation between expectancy and reaction time would generalize to more complex tasks involving a decision about which response to make. Indeed, Destrebecqz et al. (in press) have recently argued that the Perruchet effect in reaction time might be limited to the simplest and most reactive forms of voluntary responses.
A Perruchet effect in choice reaction time?
We conducted an experiment examining the strength of the effect in a simple reaction time task and a two-choice reaction time task to compare the strength of the trends and their dissociation.
The procedure was very similar to that used by Perruchet et al. (2006) ; each trial began with a 500Hz tone which lasted for 800ms. On half the trials, the tone was followed immediately by a red arrow in the centre of the screen pointing to the right, which signaled that the participant should press the right control key on a computer keyboard. In the simple (single-response) condition, the tone on the other half of the trials was not followed by a response cue, just as in the original design of the Perruchet effect. In the choice (dual-response) condition, the tone on the other half of trials was followed by a green arrow pointing left, signaling that the participant should press the left control key. Participants in both conditions were told to respond as fast as possible without either making errors or responding in the absence of the cue.
Explicit ratings of expectancy were taken in a separate phase of the experiment. In the inter-trial interval, which lasted for 3 -8 seconds, they were presented with a rating scale from 0-10 where 10 = strong expectation of the right arrow, 0 = strong expectation of no arrow / left arrow, and 5 = equal expectation of both. Participants used this scale to rate their expectancy of the events on the next trial. Further details of the procedure can be found in Barrett and Livesey (2009) .
Choice reaction time tasks with a relatively long interval between responses (more than 1 second) are well known for producing an alternation effect; a response will generally be made faster if it is the alternate to the response made on the preceding trial, rather than a repetition of the same response. This effect is first order, in that it is only sustained by the immediately preceding trial and there is evidence that it is not produced by either contingency learning or expectancy of an alternation (Barrett & Livesey, 2009 ). Because of this alternation effect, the effect of runs was examined for negative runs and positive runs separately, since in the dualresponse condition all negative runs involve an alternation on the final trial and all positive runs involve a repetition on the final trial.
We took the reaction times and expectancy for each individual, and for each set of 4 runs, found the best fitting linear function through the four points. The slope of these functions served as the measure of reaction time (RT) and expectancy trends across run lengths.
Results
Figure 2 shows median RT for the right response, calculated as a function of run length for positive and negative runs in each group. The slope of each function is expressed in ms/run units. These function slopes (and p values for a onesample t-test against zero) were -4.08 (p=.020) for negative runs in the single-response group, -6.23 (p=.005) for negative runs in the dual-response group, -2.34 (p=.054) for positive runs in the single-response group and -6.13 (p=.026) for positive runs in the dual-response group. An ANOVA of the function slopes with run type (positive v negative) and group as factors yielded no significant main effects or interactions (largest F=2.179, p=.15) , suggesting that these negative trends in RT did not differ significantly from one another. Figure 3 depicts ratings of expectancy for the right arrow, again calculated as a function of run length for positive and negative runs in each group. The mean slope of the expectancy function is expressed as the percentage of the maximum rating (10) gained per run. The function slopes (and p values for one-sample t-test) were -6.35 (p=.002) for negative runs in the single-response group, -8.12 (p<.001) for negative runs in the dual-response group, -6.57 (p<.001) for positive runs in the single-response group and -7.17 (p=.002) for positive runs in the dual-response group. An ANOVA with run type (positive v negative) and group as factors yielded no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs<1), suggesting that the negative slopes in the expectancy functions did not differ significantly from one another. 
A Perruchet effect in spatial attention?
The orientation of attention to a particular location in space is known to be influenced by both exogenous and endogenous factors. For instance covert biases in attention are created by the sudden onset of a visual cue immediately before the presentation of a stimulus that requires effortful processing (e.g. Posner, 1980) . While attention is often considered an internal cognitive process that is intrinsically related to executive function and conscious control, it exhibits some remarkably similar characteristics to other behavioural responses and is seemingly governed by learning in a similar way. For instance, contextual cuing in visual search (Chun & Jiang, 1998 ) is a pertinent example of implicit learning guiding spatial attention in a fashion that improves the efficiency of visual search. In recent years, the study of attentional processes has relied heavily on the use of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), in which pre-defined target stimuli are presented for a brief period (<150ms) in a sequence of equally rapid distractor stimuli. RSVP presents a situation in which the conscious recognition of a stimulus is impaired by masking and interference from the distractors, and limits can be placed on the consolidation of target stimuli in memory by presenting multiple targets in short succession (e.g. Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992) .
In two experiments, we used a dual-sequence RSVP task to examine whether biases in spatial attention affected target recognition. As shown in Figure 4 , two sequences of letters were presented simultaneously, on either side of a central fixation point and separated by approximately 1.5° of visual angle. All letters were white against a black background except for target letters that appeared in red, which participants were instructed to report at the end of each trial. The rationale for the design was that any biases in attending to one of the RSVP locations over the other would improve target recognition for targets appearing in the more attended stream and would impair target recognition for targets appearing in the less attended stream. As with the choice-reaction time task, biases in attention might be mediated by conscious expectation for a target on the left or a target on the right, or by automatic facilitation on the basis of recent trial events.
Participants were informed that the target letters could appear in either the left or right stream and that they should maintain gaze on the fixation dot, attending to both streams of letters.
In the first experiment ( Figure 4A ), only one target letter appeared in each sequence. The target letter appeared equally often in either the left or right RSVP stream. Target report accuracy was impaired by presenting the letters at a rate of 70ms per item.
On each trial, participants were presented with a 500Hz tone, followed by the RSVP sequence. The offset of the tone was timed to approximately coincide with the appearance of the target stimulus. At the end of the sequence, participants reported the red letter(s) using a keyboard.
Participants were split into two conditions (N=26 in each); half performed only the target recognition task, the other half were also asked to predict which RSVP stream they expected the next target to appear, using the similar rating scale as in the RT experiment. This time, the rating was made during the inter-trial interval of the target recognition phase so that report accuracy and expectancy ratings were collected concurrently.
Results
For each participant, target report accuracy was calculated according to the run of preceding trials (same or different side) and a linear function was fitted to all points 1 . For the concurrent measurement group, expectancy was fitted in the same fashion. Figure 5 shows target report accuracy calculated as a function of run length. The mean slope of the accuracy function, expressed in accuracy percentage gained per run, was 0.58 and differed significantly from zero (t(51)=2.928, p=.005). The mean function slopes were 0.72 and 0.45 for the target report only condition and concurrent measurement condition respectively and did not differ significantly from one another (F(1,50)<0.5). Figure 6 shows rated expectancy of the side on which the target was actually presented calculated as a function of run length, for the concurrent measurement condition. The mean slope of the expectancy function, expressed as the percentage of the maximum rating gained per run, was -2.46 and differed significantly from zero (t(25)=-3.31, p=.003).
These results reveal a dissociation between trends in target recognition accuracy (revealing spatial biases in attention towards recent trial outcomes) and trends in explicit expectancy (revealing less expectancy for the recent trial outcomes on the next trial). This is very similar to the dissociation found in the original Perruchet (1985) effect in eyeblink conditioning and the effects found in simple and choice response tasks. It suggests that the covert allocation of attention in space is influenced by automatic processes in a similar fashion to overt (and perhaps phylogenetically more primitive) "conditioned" responses.
In this experiment, target recognition was impoverished because of the rapid speed of the RSVP task and the attentional demands of the task (monitoring two spatial locations at once). While attention in this task is highly controlled and voluntary, the instructions and the nature of the task itself ensure that participants attend to both RSVP streams to some degree. Therefore, although participants entertain beliefs about where the next target will occur, there is no incentive to completely focus their attention towards that location. This is probably crucial in permitting relatively subtle automatic biases in attention to emerge over runs of trials.
Manipulating control using the attentional blink. The consolidation of a target appearing in RSVP has consequences for any effortful cognitive processing that must occur shortly thereafter. For instance the recognition of an additional target appearing shortly after the first (within about 500ms) is often profoundly impaired, an effect known as the attentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992) . The attentional blink (AB) is thought to be a consequence of a temporary loss of control of visual processing caused by either capacity limitations exacerbated by the processing of the first target or by the suppression or disengagement of attention after the offset of the first target (for a recent review, see Dux & Marois, in press ). The AB is also known to be less severe when information about the first target is anticipated (such as when a high frequency stimulus is presented) and more profound when the timing or identity of the first target is unexpected (e.g. Crebolder, Jolicoeur, & McIlwaine, 2002) . The relative contributions of automatic and explicit processes towards this target anticipation effect have not previously been explored.
In the following experiment, we used the AB as a means of exploring control and selective attention. Two targets were presented in RSVP, with the second target always presented in the same (central) location so that only the position of the first target varied from trial to trial. Runs in the consistency of the spatial location of a RSVP target seem to lead to anticipation of the target location on the next trial, with explicit and performance-related anticipation trending in opposite directions. Consequently, these runs may also affect target accuracy for a second target in the AB even though there is no spatial variation in its position. Figure 4B and 4C show the trial types used in this experiment. The dual RSVP streams began as described above, with the first target always shown in either the left or right stream. However, two serial positions after the first target, the two streams were replaced by a single stream of letters appearing in the centre of the screen. The second target was always presented in this central stream, either two or seven serial positions after the first target (referred to henceforth as lag-2 and lag-7 trials).
Since this dual-target RSVP task was considerably more difficult than the single-target task, the speed of presentation was slowed to 94ms per item. The trial structure was also changed slightly so that more rest breaks could be inserted into the experiment without disrupting the runs of trials. Consequently the longest "same" and "different" runs were shorter than in previous experiments. Otherwise, the pseudo-random organisation of the trial sequence remained the same.
Trends across the runs were calculated for target report accuracy and expectancy ratings as in the previous experiment, but for the lag-2 and lag-7 trials separately.
Figure 7: Mean target report accuracy for T1 and T2, lag-2 and lag-7, by runs of previous trials for which T1 was on the same or opposite side as T1 on the present trial. Figure 7 shows target report accuracy for both the first target (T1) and the second target (T2), for each of the lag conditions, calculated as a function of run length. The mean slope of the accuracy function, expressed in accuracy percentage gained per run, (and p values for a one-sample ttest against 0) were 1.13 (p=.001) for T1 lag-7, 0.28 (p=.408) for T2 lag-7, -0.16 (p=.605) for T1 lag-2 and 1.16 (p=.004) for T2 lag-2. An analysis comparing the slope of these trends across target type (T1 vs T2), lag (2 vs 7), and group (target accuracy only vs concurrent target accuracy and expectancy) yielded a significant interaction between Figure 6 : Mean expectancy ratings for the target to appear on the correct ("same") side, according to runs of previous trials for which the target was on the same or opposite side target type and lag (F(1,58)=8.774, p=.004) but no other significant interactions or main effects (all Fs<1.5).
Figure 8: Mean expectancy ratings for the target to appear on the same side; for T1 and T2, lag-2 and lag-7, by runs of previous trials for which T1 was on the same or opposite side as T1 on the present trial. Figure 8 shows rated expectancy of the side that the first target was actually presented, for each lag condition, calculated as a function of run length, for the concurrent measurement condition (again in this experiment, this constituted half of the total sample, N=30 in each group). The mean slope of the expectancy function, expressed as the percentage of the maximum rating gained per run, was -1.43 for lag-2 trials and -1.82 for lag-7 trials. These trends both differed significantly from zero (p=.039 and p=.006 respectively on one-sample t-tests) but did not differ significantly from one another (F<1).
Similar dissociations across cognitive tasks
In two very different tasks, significant trends in performance were observed running in the opposite direction to that which would be expected from the pattern of explicit expectancy ratings.
In the reaction time experiment, performance improved (as illustrated by faster response times) with increased consecutive trials on which the tone signal was paired with a particular response cue, even though expectancy for that response cue dropped over trials with the same associative history, reflecting a strong gambler's fallacy. In other words, participants were faster at executing a correct response decision in a situation in which their explicit expectation of the correct outcome is relatively low.
In the spatial attention target recognition task, improved performance (indicated by better target recognition) was observed with repeated trials in which the target appeared on the same side as the current trial. Again in this experiment, expectancy ratings decreased with more presentations of the target on the same side as the current trial. Again, the less that participants expected the target to be on a certain side, participants were more accurate at recognising targets in situations where explicit expectation of the correct outcome is relatively low.
The Perruchet effect is therefore clearly observable in a range of cognitive tasks, including simple and choice reaction time and target recognition in RSVP. Perruchet's dissociation has been interpreted by some as clear evidence for separable learning systems; sustaining simple motor conditioning on the one hand, and declarative memory and inferential reasoning processes on the other. While the current results certainly do not challenge the existence of multiple learning processes, the fact that we observe automatic facilitation of controlled cognitive processes such as response choice and selective attention suggests that the Perruchet effect, and automatic facilitation in general, are not limited to basic motor conditioning.
Theories of automaticity and control in memory, attention and perception (e.g. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) are in principle quite consistent with the dissociations between task performance and explicit ratings observed here. It is perfectly valid to consider the Perruchet effect as an example of multiple and conflicting influences of experience on performance without necessarily concluding that those influences are served by separate learning systems per se.
By this argument, any task on which performance is sensitive to contingency learning could be influenced by that information automatically or by reasoned and explicit beliefs. Dissociating these processes in an observable fashion may require specific experimental designs and subtle variations in task demands rather than necessarily requiring a simple and highly reflexive response.
Automatic facilitation across levels of cognitive control
A logical conclusion from this approach is that the level of controlled bias deliberately placed upon task performance by the participant can dictate whether automatic facilitation is observed. As the explicit impetus to favour one response over another increases, the opportunity for automatic biases to manifest in responding diminishes. This may be one reason why concurrent measurement of expectancy and performance sometimes fails to yield the Perruchet effect. Choice reaction time is a good example. The procedure employed here yields similar trends to those seen in simple reaction time, at least when independently examining repetition trials and alternation trials as we have done here. However, this result differs substantially from a similar experiment reported by Destrebecqz et al. (in press) , where no dissociation was observed between choice RT and expectancy when the two were measured concurrently, with participants making explicit expectancy ratings immediately before each speeded response. In this case, the desire to behave in a manner which is consistent with one's own explicit predictions may well be fairly strong. Given enough motivation, participants can alter the trends in their RTs by deliberately biasing one response over the other, thereby exacting a greater degree of control. In this case, these biases work directly against the pattern of results expected from automatic processing alone.
If this analysis proves to be true then a logical prediction can be made about the ideal circumstances for observing the Perruchet effect.
In any cognitive task, automatic processing should be most observable and most easily dissociated from explicit expectations when a) a strong gambler's fallacy dictates an individual's predictions about impending events, but b) no impetus is provided for the participant to use this information to deliberately control their performance.
